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APPELLATE JUSTICE 
Ruggero J. Aldisert* 
Justice on Appeal is a pithy analysis of the problem facing appellate 
courts. Dragon hunters Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg were not 
content to look at the problem from an armchair. Instead, they walked to 
the mouth of the cave; pulled the troublesome dragon into the light, 
counted its teeth, measured its girth and tail, and decided neither to kill it 
nor kiss it. They decided to try taming it. I agree with their analysis of the 
specimen, its size, its growth, and the urgent necessity to bring the beast 
under control. I have some modest disagreements with some of their 
taming techniques. 
I have lived through ·the age of the dragon. I was present when it started 
to squeak, or whatever baby dragons do, and I have heard its roar. I have 
watched the dragetto develop into a dragone. During my first full year as 
an appellate judge in 1968, I heard ninety-seven fully briefed appeals. Last 
year I heard 250. The judges on my court are now well beyond the 
Carrington/Meador/Rosenberg "rule of thumb inposing a limit of about 
225 decisions on the merits each year" for each federal appellate judge. 
Generalizations are always risky. I have no empirical data to substan-
tiate what I am about to say, because this type of data is, at best, hard to 
come by. I can only report what I feel, and that is subject to extreme 
qualification because of my strongly held belief that it takes seasoning for 
an appellate judge to get the feel of his caseload. (I think a new judge, 
especially on a federal bench, has more difficulty reaching and justifying 
his decisions than a more experienced one.) Having announced these 
significant limitations, I will now have my say. It is this: the number of 
serious, arguable questions presented to my court from 1968 to 1977 has 
not increased proportionately with the increased caseload. Indeed, I 
make bold to say that there has been only a slight arithmetical increase of 
the number of these serious, arguable questions in the nine years I have 
been on the court. 
In retrospect, it seems that when I first sat on six panels a year with 
fifteen cases per panel, only about eight to ten cases per panel deserved 
full opinions. The rest could be and were terminated by per curiam 
opinions. Nine years later, sitting on eight panels with thirty cases per 
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panel, I am finding that only eight to ten cases out of thirty per panel 
deserve a full opinion. 
Thus, on close inspection, that dragon is not all bone and muscle. There 
is a lot of flab on him which consists of a heavy layer of appealed cases 
which do not present issues of institutional or precedential significance. 
We might as well face up to this bit of jliral physiology when we start to 
prescribe a regime for taming it. 
In the Justice on Appeal analysis, all cases must be subject to re.view 
for correctness, though some of these cases are not the proper subjects of 
institutional review. My thesis is that only cases of precedential or institu-
tional significance merit the piping of the side boys. The mine-run cases 
do not deserve the ruflles and flourishes that accompany the appellate 
tradition. And by ruftles and flourishes, I mean the ritual of oral argument 
and an opinion in every case. 
I think that distinguishing review for correctness from review for in-
stitutional or precedential purposes is important if we are to see the flab 
on our dragon. Roscoe Pound divided the judicial process into four parts: 
finding the facts, choosing a legal precept, interpreting the precept, and 
applying the precept to the facts .1 This analysis is indispensable to an 
accurate understanding of the cases that make up the slack of our dra-
gon's torso. How do I describe these cases? First, and obviously, there 
are cases that are reviewed for correctness only. By this I mean that the 
dispute centers around the facts or the application of legal precepts to the 
facts. These cases are fact cases rather than law cases; they do not 
involve choosing or interpreting legal precepts. A reviewing court's role 
in the decision of such cases is extremely limited. Second, there are cases 
which purport to present legal issues but which do not actually present 
any legal point that is arguable on its merits. I hesitate to use the word 
''frivolous'' to describe such cases because of its pejorative connotations, 
but I simply use the word in the sense that the Supreme Court used it in 
Anders v. California, 2 when it referred to "legal points arguable on their 
merits (and therefore not frivolous) .... " 3 In 1921, drawing from his 
experience on the New York Court of Appeals, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
would say: ''Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a 
majority, I think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any 
way but one. The law and its application alike are plain. Such cases are 
predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without opinion. " 4 Over a half 
century later, speaking from my vantage point on the United States Court 
of Apeals for the Third Circuit, I say: "Amen." 
Cardozo continued his analysis: "In another and considerable percent-
age, the rule of law is certain, and the application alone doubtful."5 By 
1924 Cardozo would say, "Nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that 
1 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 5-6 (1959). 
2 386 u .s. 738 (1967). 
3 Id. at 744. 
4 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164 (1921). 
5 Id. 
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come before a court are predetermined-predetermined in the sense that 
they are predestined-their fate preestablished by inevitable laws that 
follow them from birth to death. The range of free activity is relatively 
small."6 In 1961, Judge Henry J. Friendly would observe: "Indeed, 
Cardozo's nine-tenths estimate probably should be read as referring to the 
first category alone. Thus reading it, Professor Harry W. Jones finds it 
'surprising' on the high side .... So would I. If it includes both categor-
ies, I would not." 7 
Cardozo suggested a third category: 
[A] percentage, not large indeed, and yet not so small as to be negligi-
ble, where a decision one way or the other, will count for the future, 
will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the de-
velopment of the law. These are the cases where the creative element 
in the judicial process finds its opportunity and power.8 
The mine-run federal criminal cases probably can be classed in Car-
dozo' s first category, where "[t]he law and its application alike are 
plain. " 9 The judicial menu is dreadfully routine. Swollen United States 
Attorney staffs are now prosecuting cases that traditionally have been the 
province of state prosecutors. They are giving us bank robberies, narco-
tics dealings, and conspiracies galore, as well as a host of state mis-
demeanors, made felonies by federal law, which embellish and aggrandize 
federal prosecutorial statistics. Putting aside the crises in identification 
and guilty plea procedures, and the suppression issues, of a few years 
back, the criminal appeals are now a dreary lot. Last year, our court 
affirmed 92.3% of all criminal appeals. The average for all federal courts 
of appeals was 89.3%. 10 
In the same category are civil appeals raising questions of the suffi-
ciency of evidence, the exercise of discretion in the reception of evidence, 
and the precise, detailed correctness of jury instructions. Likewise, peti-
tions for agency review raising only questions of substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole would fall into Cardozo's first category. 
Second category cases-deciding whether the facts at hand are gov-
erned by the rule oflaw-require more attention. They require more than 
mere knowledge of the precedents, for these are amply provided by the 
advocates in their briefs. What is required is an understanding of the 
policy behind the precedents, and here judicial experience counts a lot. 
Here also the skill of the appellate advocate comes to the fore, to per-
suade the court whether a given precedent, in Karl Llewellyn's formula-
tion, should be given strict or loose interpretation. The strict view con-
fines the precedent to its particular facts: "This rule holds only of red-
headed Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars." 11 The loose view, of 
6 B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924). 
7 Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222 n. 23 
(1961). 
8 B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 165 .(1921). 
9 Id. at 164. 
10 In fairness to the federal prosecutors, I ought to add that the statistics do reflect a 
concentration of resources on cases where solid convictions can be obtained. 
11 K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-67 (1960). 
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course, goes the other way and expands welcome precedents. These 
cases are usually judgment calls. Their resolution depends upon the skill 
of the advocate in highlighting those interests-social, political, 
economic-which intrigue the court at a given time. But the decision 
process is not taxing, and the work of justification, the reasoned elabora-
tion, is not too burdensome. 
It is the third category cases where maximum time and energy must be 
committed. These are the cases, in Cardozo's phrase, which involve the 
"creative element"12 in the judicial process. In Pound's formulation, 
these are the cases which involve choosing or interpreting legal precepts. 
And it is for these cases that sufficient time absolutely must be allotted to 
allow full institutional review. 
If time is to be rationed, as it must be, maximum time must be given to 
the decisionmaking process. I am persuaded that a reasonably intelligent, 
experienced judge should have no difficulty in reading thoroughly and 
understanding 240 sets of briefs per year. I doubt whether one can do 
more and do justice to an appeal which, for all intents and purposes, is 
final. The assistance ofparajudicial aides, whether law clerks in chambers 
or staff attorneys at the courthouse, cannot supplant the absolute neces-
sity that the judge read the briefs himself. I do in every case. This is an 
article of faith. Moreover, the standard operating procedure in my cham-
bers is that at least one of my two law clerks reads every set of briefs as 
well. In cases coming within the second and third categories of the 
Cardozo formulation, a second law clerk also reads the briefs. We prepare 
a bench memorandum in every case identifying the arguments raised, the 
answers to the arguments, and the district court's disposition. And each 
of us makes a tentative recommendation for disposition of the appeal. If 
my law clerks and I are not unanimous in our thinking, the case is marked 
for a chamber conference in which the three of us will discuss the case in 
depth, face to face. All of this takes place at least ten days before the case 
is listed for disposition. 
Under the Internal Operating Procedures of our court, oral argument 
may be had upon the vote of one judge on a panel. Where another judge 
has voted for oral argument in a case in which argument was not re-
quested by our chambers, that case is listed for a chamber's conference 
and reexamination. Thus, I believe in maximum utilization of chamber's 
time for thorough, detailed, analytical study of the briefs prior to the week 
of disposition. I consider this to be the most essential aspect of the 
appellate process. 
Nearly as important as chamber's preparation is a full and complete 
discussion of the issues among the judges at the decision conference. 
Because decisions reached at conference are so often final, I make it a 
point to encourage discussion, even prolonged discussion, among the 
judges as we sit around the conference table analyzing the cases. To me 
this face to face discussion of the issues raised is not only essential, but it 
12 8. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 165. 
SPRING 1978] Appellate Justice 321 
must be unhurried. Thus, I cannot accept the suggestion that a decision 
conference can be held on the bench. I admit that I have not had any 
experience with this type of conference but, because it is not conducive to 
extended discussion, I would not recommend it. 
From what I have said, it should be obvious that I vote for oral 
argument in a minority of cases. After reading the briefs thoroughly, 
preparing a bench memorandum synthesizing the arguments and, fre-
quently, discussing the case in chambers, I see little purpose in having the 
arguments repeated orally in any case where the law is clear and its 
application to the facts is plain and in most cases where the sole issue is 
the application of a given rule of law to the facts at hand. I always vote for 
oral argument in cases in the third category, where the court works for the 
future. 
Constraints of time demand the tradeoff. I would rather have adequate 
time for a decision conference, allowing for the discussion of complex and 
difficult issues, in third category cases than be forced to shortchange 
those cases by the process of automatically granting oral argument in 
every case. The suggestion that there be a rule requiring argument only 
where the attorneys request it is not realistic, because no attorney worth 
his salt will ever waive oral argument. 
I would agree that the optimum is to have a written opinion in every 
case. I embrace completely the concept of reasoned elaboration, a phrase 
coined by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in 1958. 
The phrase, as applied to the Supreme Court, demanded, first, that 
judges give reasons for their decisions; second, that the reasons be set 
forth in a detailed and coherent manner; third, that they exemplify 
what Hart called ''the maturing of collective thought"; and fourth, that 
the court adequately demonstrate that its decisions, in the area of 
constitutional law, were vehicles for the expression of the ultimate 
social preferences of contemporary society. 13 
Unfortunately, time does not permit an opinion in every case, and the 
suggestion that a short memorandum will suffice runs contrary to the 
experience in writing and speaking that it often takes longer to prepare a 
short, concise presentation than it does to prepare a longer one. 
Looking to the future, I can only hope that lawyers, and their clients, 
will learn to discipline themselves and present to the appellate courts only 
those cases that survive the Anders definition offrivolity, i.e., those cases 
presenting an arguable question. 14 Sanctions of some kind will sooner or 
later have to be imposed to prevent the groundless appeal. Until then, the 
appellate courts will have to limit the full treatment of oral argument and 
opinion writing to cases of institutional or precedential value. In those 
cases where the appellate courts merely approve the correctness of the 
trial court's application of settled law to the facts, there should be no oral 
argument and no opinion. Briefs will be sufficient, and no explanation will 
be necessary for the good lawyer. The good lawyer will know why he lost. 
13 White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social 
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 286 (1973). 
14 386 U.S. at 774. 
